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JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
Appellants Michael Rakaczewski, Esq., and Wendy Bentzoni appeal from the 
order of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania denying 
their motions for summary judgment based on assertions of absolute and qualified 
immunity.  Because this appeal asks us to determine if the District Court erred as to what 
material facts are genuinely at issue, we will dismiss for lack of appellate jurisdiction.   
I. Background1 
On the morning of February 11, 2008, a sixteen-year-old girl, AJ, and a fifteen-
year-old girl, TM, went to the Pocono Mountain Regional Police Department and 
reported that they had been sexually assaulted on February 9, 2008, by multiple men at a 
house party.  The girls were interviewed separately and, in describing the assaults they 
said were committed by the Appellees – William Spiess, Kasheen Thomas, Gene 
Thomas, II, Jaleel Holden, and Jose Lacen – they gave different accounts of what 
happened.  Although their accounts varied, it is undisputed that the girls were at a party, 
that the Appellees were also there, and that sexual activity took place.     
After the girls were interviewed, Detective Richard Luthcke of the Pocono 
Mountain Regional Police Department and Bentzoni, a detective for the Monroe County 
District Attorney’s Office, took AJ to the Pegasus Child Advocacy Center in Carbondale, 
Pennsylvania, where she was examined by the Medical Director, Dr. Andi Taroli.  
                                              
1 As we write solely for the parties, we set forth only those facts necessary to our 
analysis. 
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Dr. Taroli confirmed that AJ had been sexually assaulted.  Luthcke then called his 
supervisor, Detective Chris Wagner, regarding the alleged assault and brought Wagner 
into the on-going investigation.  Luthcke and Wagner spoke with AJ together, but the 
interview was not recorded.   
That evening, a group of detectives went to Spiess’s residence, where Spiess’s 
mother told the detectives that TM’s family had spoken to her and her husband about the 
party.  Spiess’s mother gave the detectives a note in TM’s handwriting stating that Spiess 
was not involved in the alleged assaults.  Approximately two hours later, Spiess 
voluntarily arrived at police headquarters and was interviewed by Luthcke and another 
detective.  Luthcke then prepared search and arrest warrants for Lacen, at whose home 
the alleged assaults took place.  Wagner reviewed the warrants and affidavits of probable 
cause and spoke with Rakaczewski, a Monroe County Assistant District Attorney,2 who 
approved the warrants.  The warrants were then presented to a judge.   
The judge granted the search and arrest warrants, and authorities executed a search 
at Lacen’s home.  They arrested him shortly before midnight on February 11, 2008.  The 
remaining Appellees were variously arrested on February 25, 2008, and March 24, 2008.  
The Appellees were each charged with multiple counts of rape.  Three of the five 
                                              
2 Rakaczewski was the sexual assault prosecutor in the District Attorney’s Office.  
Relevant here, in the spring of 2006 and October of 2007, AJ made allegations of sexual 
abuse against a family member, which the police determined to be unfounded but 
forwarded to Rakaczewski.  He declined to prosecute based on the police’s determination 
that the allegations were unfounded.   
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Appellees were minors, but they were charged as adults because AJ claimed that a knife 
was used during the assault.  
A preliminary hearing was held on March 28, 2008, at which AJ and TM testified, 
and the Appellees were subsequently incarcerated for nearly a year awaiting trial.  In 
January 2009, however, the District Attorney’s Office received a letter from AJ’s school 
stating that she had confessed to giving false statements and testimony.  The school’s 
letter indicated that she said that the sexual activity had been consensual and that no knife 
was involved.  When Rakaczewski and Luthcke interviewed AJ, she denied the school’s 
allegation.  However, during a second interview, AJ confessed to lying about three 
things: that Spiess assaulted her, that there was alcohol at the party, and that a knife was 
involved in the assault.  In February 2009, Rakaczewski filed a nolle prosequi petition 
and agreed to the Appellees’ subsequent expungement petitions.   
The Appellees then filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging, inter alia, 
false arrest and false imprisonment against certain detectives, including Bentzoni, and a 
false arrest claim against Rakaczewski in his investigative capacity.  The Appellants and 
other defendants3 filed motions for summary judgment, in which the Appellants asserted 
both absolute and qualified immunity.  The District Court denied summary judgment on 
those immunity claims.   
                                              
3 The defendants included Bentzoni, Rakaczewski, and four Pocono Regional 
Police Department detectives, including Wagner and Luthcke, as well as the chief of 
police and various municipal defendants.  Some defendants were dismissed, and a 
stipulated dismissal pursuant to a settlement disposed of the remaining defendants save 
for Rakaczewski and Bentzoni, who are the only defendants before us now. 
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In denying Rakaczewski’s claim of absolute immunity, the District Court referred 
to its holding on an earlier motion to dismiss, in which the Court had ruled that “[t]he 
complaint plausibly alleges that ADA Rakaczewski’s actions were akin to merely 
advising officers as to probable cause or directing the gathering of evidence in an 
investigative capacity,” which would not entitle him to absolute immunity.  (App. at 42.)  
As to Bentzoni’s claim of absolute immunity, the Court likewise held that, because 
Bentzoni’s actions were investigative, she too was not entitled to absolute immunity.   
Turning to qualified immunity, the District Court determined that “the existence of 
disputed historical facts material to the objective reasonableness of ADA Rakaczewski’s 
conduct must be resolved by a jury.”  (App. at 46.)  The Court noted that Rakaczewski’s 
arguments for qualified immunity were “almost identical to his arguments for absolute 
immunity,” in that they hinged on whether he was acting in a prosecutorial or 
investigative role.  (Id.)  Importantly, the District Court noted that Rakaczewski “fails to 
recall whether or not he was physically present at [police] Headquarters during the 
investigation.”  (Id.)  But, as the Court pointed out, police detectives testified that 
“Rakaczewski was present at the police station and was one of the individuals who made 
the collective determination as to whether or not probable cause existed.”  (Id.)  Next, the 
Court found that Bentzoni was “intimately involved with the investigation” but that the 
“objective reasonableness of Bentzoni’s conduct is a disputed factual issue.”  (App. at 47-
48.)  In conclusion, the Court “decline[d] to find qualified immunity” for Rakaczewski or 
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Bentzoni, “viewing the unresolved factual issues in the light most favorable to plaintiffs.”  
(App. at 50.)4 
The Appellants timely appealed.  The Appellees responded by moving to quash or 
dismiss this interlocutory appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.  They argue that we 
lack jurisdiction over the District Court’s denial of summary judgment on the question of 
immunity because that denial is based on the existence of disputed issues of material fact.  
We asked the parties to address our jurisdiction, and, on May 23, 2013, following 
submissions from the parties, we issued an order declining to dismiss the instant appeal 
but directing the parties to further address our jurisdiction in their briefing. 
II. Discussion5 
We conclude that we do not have jurisdiction and must therefore dismiss the 
appeal without reaching the merits. 
A. Interlocutory Appeals 
We have jurisdiction over “all final decisions of the district courts.”  28 U.S.C.  
§ 1291.  Given that statutory mandate, “interlocutory appeals – appeals before the end of 
district court proceedings – are the exception, not the rule.”  Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 
304, 309 (1995).  Certain “collateral orders,” however, may qualify as final orders if they 
                                              
4 The Appellants also sought summary judgment on the merits.  The District Court 
granted the motion with respect to the malicious prosecution claim against Bentzoni but 
concluded that a genuine dispute of material fact existed as to the malicious prosecution 
claim against Rakaczewski and the false arrest and false imprisonment claims against 
both Appellants. 
5 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  “We necessarily 
exercise de novo review over an argument alleging a lack of appellate jurisdiction.”  
Montanez v. Thompson, 603 F.3d 243, 248 (3d Cir. 2010).  
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are part of a “small class” of orders that would “finally determine claims of right 
separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied 
review and too independent of the cause itself to require [waiting] until the whole case is 
adjudicated.”  Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949); see 
Eddy v. V.I. Water & Power Auth., 256 F.3d 204, 208 (3d Cir. 2001) (establishing review 
of collateral orders when they would “(1) conclusively determine the disputed question, 
(2) resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits …, and (3) be 
effectively unreviewable on appeal”).  An order denying summary judgment when the 
defendant is asserting immunity may be an appealable collateral order.  See Plumhoff v. 
Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2018-19 (2014) (stating that “pretrial orders denying qualified 
immunity generally fall within the collateral order doctrine”); Johnson, 515 U.S. at 312 
(stating that denial of qualified immunity is an appealable collateral order when denial 
turns on a question of law); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 743 (1982) (finding 
appellate jurisdiction over the denial of the President’s absolute immunity claim).   
Qualified immunity protects government officials from the burdens of a trial 
“insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 
800, 818 (1982).  This requires a two-step analysis: (1) whether the facts, taken in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiff, show that the officer’s conduct violated a 
constitutional right, and (2) whether the right was clearly established, such that “it would 
be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he 
confronted.”  Barton v. Curtis, 497 F.3d 331, 335 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation 
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marks omitted) (dismissing appeal for lack of jurisdiction due to district court’s 
determination that whether the defendant acted recklessly was a question for the jury). 
Under the more limited doctrine of absolute immunity, prosecutors are immune 
from suit under § 1983 for “initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution.”  Imbler v. 
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 410 (1976).  Prosecutors are protected only by qualified 
immunity, however, for actions taken in an “investigative or administrative capacity.”  
Carter v. City of Phila., 181 F.3d 339, 356 (3d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202, 217 (3d Cir. 2008) (denying absolute 
immunity after determining that defendants performed a “fundamentally administrative 
task”).  Such investigative functions include giving legal advice to the police as to the 
existence of probable cause.  Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 496 (1991); Kulwicki v. 
Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1465 (3d Cir. 1992). 
It is well-established that we have jurisdiction over an appeal from a denial of 
immunity that presents issues of law but that we do not have jurisdiction over an appeal 
from a denial of immunity that is based on questions of fact.  See, e.g., Plumhoff, 134 S. 
Ct. at 2019 (exercising jurisdiction over the denial of qualified immunity when the 
district court’s order was based on legal issues rather than “purely factual issues”); Dotzel 
v. Ashbridge, 438 F.3d 320, 324 (3d Cir. 2006) (indicating that, where factual disputes 
remain, a denial of absolute immunity is only immediately appealable “to the extent that 
the order turns on an issue of law”); In re Montgomery Cnty., 215 F.3d 367, 373 (3d Cir. 
2000) (noting that a “denial of qualified immunity falls within the collateral-order 
doctrine only to the extent the denial turns on the issue of law”).  When a defendant’s 
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motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity is denied, “we lack 
jurisdiction to consider whether the district court correctly identified the set of facts that 
the summary judgment record is sufficient to prove.”  Ziccardi v. City of Phila., 288 F.3d 
57, 61 (3d Cir. 2002); see Johnson, 515 U.S. at 319-20 (denying appellate jurisdiction to 
review a district court’s determination of whether a dispute of fact is “genuine”).     
Thus, our jurisdiction to review the District Court’s order denying summary 
judgment here “depends on whether the … appeal raises pure questions of law or whether 
it challenges the District Court’s determination of which facts were sufficiently supported 
by evidence.”  Blaylock v. City of Phila., 504 F.3d 405, 409 (3d Cir. 2007).       
The District Court’s denial of absolute immunity was not expressly grounded on a 
conclusion that a genuine dispute of material fact existed.  However, the Appellants 
challenge the factual premise of the District Court’s ruling that they were not entitled to 
absolute immunity.  With regard to Rakaczewski, the Appellants directly ask us to 
“decid[e] whether there are genuine issues of fact that preclude summary judgment” on 
the issue of absolute immunity.  (Appellant’s Reply Br. at 4.)  With regard to Bentzoni, 
the Appellants challenge the District Court’s factual determination, stated elsewhere in its 
order, that Bentzoni was “intimately involved with the investigation.”  (App. at 47.)  The 
appeal of the absolute immunity ruling thus turns on factual disputes, which we have no 
jurisdiction to review at this stage.   
The District Court denied qualified immunity based on its express determination 
that there are disputed issues of material fact.  The Court expressly noted the “unresolved 
factual issues” (App. at 50), which precluded the Appellants’ motion for summary 
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judgment.  In coming to that conclusion, the District Court relied in part on the fact that, 
although Rakaczewski could not remember if he was present at police headquarters, 
police detectives testified that Rakaczewski was not only at the station, but he was part of 
the investigation.  The District Court’s determination that this factual discrepancy exists 
is unreviewable at this stage.  Likewise, the Court found, as noted, that Bentzoni was 
“intimately involved with the investigation,” and whether her actions were objectively 
reasonable was a matter of dispute.  (App. at 47-48.)  Bentzoni’s appeal is thus premised 
on a factual challenge regarding her level of involvement.  We have no jurisdiction to 
resolve such issues. 
To preclude summary judgment, however, a dispute of fact must be material.  Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 56.  Looking at the record, we agree that the factual dispute as to what actions 
Rakaczewski took on February 11, 2008, are material to the immunity issue, as both 
absolute and qualified immunity turn on what role he played that day, i.e., was it 
investigative and, if so, were his actions objectively reasonable.  See Carter, 181 F.3d at 
356 (actions taken in an investigative capacity are entitled only to qualified immunity). 
Included in this factual dispute is whether Rakaczewski was even present at police 
headquarters for the investigation and determination of probable cause.  The District 
Court concluded that the record presents a clear dispute about where Rakaczewski was 
and what he did, which is properly reserved for the jury.  Likewise, the dispute over what 
actions Bentzoni undertook as a liaison between the police and District Attorney’s Office, 
and whether those actions were reasonable, is material to her immunity claims as well.  
The Appellants argue that “their actions did not violate clearly established law and were 
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objectively reasonable” (Appellants’ Opening Br. at 20 (emphasis added)), yet what 
exactly those actions were is in dispute and goes to the heart of their immunity claims. 
Indeed, the Appellants do not argue that the District Court made an error of law.  
Rather, they assert that “there are no facts in the record presented by the plaintiffs to strip 
[Appellants] of their immunity defenses.”  (Id. at 14.)  That assertion, directly at odds 
with the District Court’s view of the record, implicates the type of factual determination 
which we cannot address at this stage in the litigation.  “We have no jurisdiction[] ... in 
an interlocutory appeal to review a District Court’s determination that there is sufficient 
record evidence to support a set of facts under which there would be no immunity.” 
Schieber v. City of Phila., 320 F.3d 409, 415 (3d Cir. 2003).6   
III.   Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss the appeal. 
                                              
6 The Appellants also challenge the District Court’s ruling on the merits of their claims, 
which the Court denied due to the existence of genuine disputes of material fact.  We 
similarly lack jurisdiction to review these rulings.  Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 
2018 (2014) (“An order denying a motion for summary judgment is generally not a final 
decision within the meaning of § 1291 and is thus generally not immediately 
appealable.”). 
